Category Archives: Philosophy

Nietzsche and the New Existential Citizen

One enduring critique of Nietzsche of particular relevance to the Existential Citizenship Project—besides the widespread misperception of him as a nihilist mentioned before—has been his apparent aversion to actual politics, and particularly his lack of prescriptions for political action.[1] His aversion to politics is not only apparent at the level of institutions (e.g., in his denunciations of the state as the “coldest of all cold monsters,” and that “only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous”[2]), but also even in his more metaphysical conceptions of human nature itself.[3]

Nietzsche, the individual, and the State

For example, consider the declaration of Nietzsche that, “Every philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a political event is a joke—and pseudo-philosophy.” In particular, according to Nietzsche, the problem with conceiving of politics as a solution for our fundamental, existential problems results from the collective organization of the State as such itself:

Many states have been founded since the world began; that is an old story. How should a political innovation suffice to turn men once and for all into contented inhabitants of the earth? [That people think the answer to existential questions might come from politics shows] that we are experiencing the consequences of the doctrine…that the state is the highest goal of mankind and that a man has no higher duty than to serve the state: in which doctrine I recognize a relapse not into paganism but into stupidity. It may be that a man who sees his highest duty in serving the state really knows no higher duties; but there are men and duties existing beyond this—and one of the duties that seems, at least to me, to be higher than serving the state demands that one destroys stupidity in every form, and therefore in this form too. That is why I am concerned with a species of man whose teleology extends somewhat beyond the welfare of a state…, and with [this kind of man] only in relation to a world which is again fairly independent of the welfare of a state, that of culture.[4]

In other words, according to Nietzsche, the emergence of the State as a substantial form of collective human organization has not even been a step backwards for humankind, but rather a step nowhere. Likewise, against the assumption that the highest purposes of humankind are realized via or under or within this collective, Nietzsche is concerned instead with the kind of people capable of existing outside of or beyond the State.

A philosophical stance this dismissive about the relation of humans with collective political organizations like a State would seem to offer little by way of support for a project to promote more meaningful political engagement like the Existential Citizenship Project. Such is not the case.

Democracy, individualism, and the existential citizen

This animus against the State as an institution and against politics in general is a function of the ultimate goal of the philosophy of Nietzsche: The elevation of truly excellent individuals with the unique capacity to create their own values. This emphasis on the individual is also why Nietzsche is so often—and so justifiably—accused of being antagonistic to democracy. The combination of this animus against collective action and the exaltation of the individual would seem to render moot any substantial application of Nietzsche’s thought to politics, and particularly any applications to real-world, day-to-day politics which are the focus of the Existential Citizenship Project.

However, there is more to the philosophical project of Nietzsche than meets the eye. On the one hand, Nietzsche is openly and defiantly antagonistic towards democracy. For Nietzsche, democracy represents the decadent urge for the great levelling of humanity and the dilution of individual greatness, which again is his ultimate standard.[5] All of that being said, though, there are strands of thought in the work of Nietzsche which point towards an interesting reconciliation of individualism with political engagement, against the intentions of even Nietzsche himself, which are particularly appropriate for an existential conception of citizenship.

For example, Lawrence Hatab, in his 1995 book A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy, combines the agonistic and perspectival aspects of democracy with Nietzsche’s core concept of will to power, while discounting the necessity for a notion of rights in democracy and revising its traditional egalitarian rhetoric, to offer a Nietzschean conception of democracy that enhances individuality in the ways Nietzsche celebrates. Thus, while Nietzsche himself may have been overtly anti-democratic, which would seem to invalidate the application of his thought to a project to enhance participation in representative government, interwoven throughout his work are threads of thought which contribute substantially to the conception of existential citizenship I propose.

As such, in reconciling all these different threads, the Existential Citizenship Project represents not only an extension of the thought of Nietzsche to politics, and a refinement of existentialism as it pertains to politics, but also a substantial clarification of politics itself via existentialism. In particular, the ways that existentialism justifies political engagement will be shown to reconcile the hyperindividualism of Nietzsche’s project with meaningful political action. The result is the kinds of independent yet engaged citizens that more conventional conceptions of citizenship have aspired to for centuries, but failed to accomplish thus far.

Again, as discussed in much more detail elsewhere, these previous conceptions of citizenship have fallen short in large part because these conceptions of citizenship have been constructed upon a distinctively modern (i.e., non-heroic or non-tragic) understanding of people and of politics. Filling in these holes is the primary contribution of adopting existentialism as the primary orientation towards politics, and of adopting Nietzsche as a specific lens.


Nussbaum, Martha, 1997. “Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 5: 1–13; See also


Thus Spoke Zarathustra I:11


For example, in section 21 of Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes how the “Dionysian liberation from the fetters of the individual finds expression first of all in a diminution of, indifference to, indeed, in hostility to, the political instincts.”


Untimely Meditations III: 4


For example, “Who still wanteth to rule? Who still wanteth to obey? Both are too burdensome. No shepherd, and one herd! Every one wanteth the same; every one is equal: he who hath other sentiments goeth voluntarily into the madhouse.” (Z Prologue 5)

The Life-affirming Values of the Existential Citizen

What we value determines the focus of our energies and our estimations of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’, and success and failure. In the context of political engagement, which is the focus of the Existential Citizenship Project, whether a person gets involved in politics or not, and which issues or candidates they support or not, obviously depends on the values of that person. Likewise, as the values of a person change, so also will change their political involvement accordingly, as a reflection of these changes in their values.

The source of values

Where do these values come from? This may sound like a question with obvious answers, but it is one of the most profound questions of philosophy. The answer that Friedrich Nietzsche has for this question is that to be human is to be a “valuator,”[1] or to assign significance to things. In other words, assigning values to things is just something that we do as humans, which distinguishes us from other animals. The way that Bernard Reginster describes the nature of this valuing in his book on Nietzsche’s work, “To evaluate is to give color to a world that is, in itself, evaluatively colorless.”[2] As an example of both the need and the function of this impulse to value, consider that the incapacity to assign value to or to perceive the value of things is one sign of clinical depression.[3]

To the degree that Nietzsche is correct about this innate impulse to value suggests a couple of things: First, that there is no escape for us from this innately human impulse to assign or to assume values, and, second, that we are not just reading these values from nature (otherwise, we would not have changes in the values we assign to different things, or have the differences in our perceptions of values that are the very fabric of our political discourse).

However, even if we do have this innate human impulse to assign values to things, this does not yet explain where these values come from. Again, the origins of these values would not be an issue if these values were inherent in the things being valued, or otherwise objective (i.e., given to us from an external source independent of our individual or even collective beliefs). Since they are not, though, if the value of these values is to be accurately assessed, then the origin of these values needs to be established.

If the values of things are neither inherent in the things themselves nor objectively given, the next most likely possibility is that people get their notions of value from the people, institutions, and social milieu around them. At first glance this might seem unobjectionable, necessary, and obviously beneficial, as the sharing of common values seems the glue which holds societies together. However, the uncritical adoption of these conventional values is only beneficial if these common values are in fact the best values for us, in the sense that they will motivate us to achieve the highest or the best outcomes, whatever these might be determined to be.[4]

What if this is not the case? From his many extensive moral histories and genealogies,[5] Nietzsche concludes that these traditional, conventional values are for the most part life-negating, in the sense that they are not realizable in this world (i.e., they require supernatural intervention or another metaphysical world other than this one to be realized), or they explicitly condemn life in this world, or compliance with these values is harmful to life.[6] Nietzsche saw this negation of life by the prevailing values of society as the gasoline on the fire of the pervasive nihilism that was consuming the post-Enlightenment culture of his time for the way these values not only could no longer provide the ultimate meaning they once had, but were also actively removing such meaning from the world.

Luckily, per Nietzsche, this cultural inheritance is not the only source of values: Instead of uncritically accepting the values given us, we can create our own tables of values—if we have the fortitude to do so, that is. Describing how these new values can be created, and who can create them, is a major focus of the project of Nietzsche. Likewise, because this core problem of the loss of meaning is still with us, as the product of our conventional values, the Existential Citizenship Project is also premised upon the need for a revaluation of values, with the goal of creating those values which will motivate meaningful and enduring political engagement regardless of the success or failure of our political projects.

Creation of new value

The first step in this creation of values, according to Nietzsche, is to devalue all those conventional values that are hostile to life in this world as it actually is—such as this naïve conception of hope discussed before—which lead to disappointment, withdrawal, and, eventually, nihilism. The next step is to develop or exert the will to create new values that affirm life in this world as it is, even when these values conflict with the most cherished values of society—which they inevitably will.

To create these life-affirming values requires first confronting the world as it is, because otherwise our orientation towards this world becomes one of hostility or detachment.[7] This confrontation comes primarily as the acceptance that life in this world includes suffering, and sometimes great and pointless suffering, as well as the frustration of even our most sincere desires. Because we will always encounter suffering and obstacles in this world, and because so many of our desires will so often go unfulfilled, our fundamental motivation for action (i.e., what we value) cannot be freedom from unease, the fulfillment of our wants, or the completion of our actions according to our desires.[8] If the absence of suffering and the fulfillment of our desires are our ultimate values, what Nietzsche characterizes as “the universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for every one,”[9] then the inevitable frustrations of this world will eventually become the invalidation of our most deeply held values. This end state is nihilism, as the belief that these values are simply not realizable in this world, or rather that life and the world do not have an ultimate purpose, or at least not an ultimate purpose that includes the realization of our highest values.[10]

This presents a rather thorny problem, though: If even the desire for the realization of our goals leads to nihilism, what else could be the grounds for our highest values that will still motivate us to action even as we recognize the ultimate arbitrariness and absurdity of life? The answer to this question constitutes one of the central questions of existentialism.

When the goal is not the goal

In other words, the core of the project of Nietzsche—as with most subsequent existentialists—is to find a way to motivate engagement with life while “facing up to the terrors of nature and history,”[11] and without seeking refuge through detachment or withdrawal. Notably, this is the same question that the Existential Citizenship Project provides the answer for, only in regards to political engagement in particular (i.e., what can the grounds for meaningful and enduring political engagement be, even in the face of the arbitrariness and absurdity of politics, and the high likelihood of the frustration and failure of even our deeply personal political projects?)

The answer that Nietzsche provides—and that the Existential Citizenship Project applies to political engagement—is that instead of making the outcome of our actions our highest value, the desire to seek out and overcome resistance must become an end in itself. As Bernard Reginster puts it in his book The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, the way one does this, according to Nietzsche, is by valuing not only the overcoming of resistance, but by also valuing the resistance to overcoming, as resistance to the temptation for completion.[12]

By this is meant that instead of valuing the results of our actions as our ultimate end, the overcoming of resistance itself must become our ultimate goal—with the corollary that the greater the resistance, the greater the achievement.[13] Only through embracing these kinds of values will we never run out of motivation for action, given that the world as it is supplies constant challenges and disappointments, which then also precludes descending into apathy or the nihilism that robs our lives of meaning. Further, as will be discussed in more detail elsewhere, life-affirming values of this vein also necessarily entail the searching out of ever greater resistances to overcome after each success. The implications of this for meaningful and enduring political engagement will also be discussed in subsequent posts.

The life-affirming values of the existential citizen

The preceding discussion has been primarily about the solution of Nietzsche for the existential crisis of nihilism in general. Such a broad application of existentialism to life itself and to the world are incompatible with the religious or metaphysical beliefs of many to most people, which presumably narrows the scope of the application of these principles. However, as mentioned elsewhere, one of the greatest benefits of the Existential Citizenship Project is that limiting these principles to the domain of politics actually greatly expands their scope of application and their utility to anyone seeking meaningful and enduring political engagement, regardless of religious belief or political ideology.

Reality must be confronted

So how does this prescription by Nietzsche for the creation of new values apply more precisely and exclusively to politics in general, and to specific political actions?

First, it requires the unflinching confrontation of the domain of politics as it is, and not how we might wish or hope it to be. This is the first principle of the Existential Citizenship Project, for without this unblinking assessment of politics, any actions taken will begin with the wrong trajectory, and thus be less likely to hit their mark.[14]

This does not assume a complete or perfect or unchanging understanding of the political system or of the specific policy domain in question. Instead, this means gathering as much information as possible given one’s circumstances, as well as constantly updating this understanding of reality in the face of new information. More will be said about this point in subsequent posts, but this frank confrontation with the realities of the political system is a core principle of the Existential Citizenship Project.

The political system is not only irreducibly complex, but also Absurd

The next stage of the creation of values for meaningful and enduring political engagement—which is the natural product of the first—is the recognition that the political system is both irreducibly complex and Absurd.

As discussed in more detail elsewhere, a good technical definition of complexity is the increasing abstraction of effects from their causes. This increasing distance between effects and their causes does not mean that political causes and their effects can never be identified. This is rather the much more modest claim that the connections between these causes and their effects cannot be consistently or definitively identified, except in trivial or tautological cases (e.g., that the person who wins an election will assume that seat, etc.). There may be consistent regularities and correlations between events, but the conclusive identification of causes for effects will be elusive and always susceptible to being supplanted by new findings.

That said, as the Existential Citizenship Project applies existentialist principles like this exclusively to politics, one can believe that there is a mindful deity guiding the events of this world according to a preordained plan, or that there is at least a benevolent order to the universe, and still accept the empirical evidence—which will be presented in subsequent posts—about the irreducible complexity of the political system.

The Absurdity of politics is similar to complexity in some ways, but also substantially different. As also discussed elsewhere, in existentialism writ large, the Absurd is a technical term for the conflict between our innate human need to find meaning and the ultimate lack of inherent meaning in the universe. The Absurdity of politics is thus not only that causes are so often dissociated from their effects, but that even the identifiable events and outcomes of the political system do not have inherent meaning of their own.

In other words, the only the meaning or value that political occurrences have are the meaning or value that we give to them. Again, this is not to say that things do not happen for (often) identifiable reasons. Rather, this is just to say that the things that do happen do not carry or convey inherent values which we then perceive. Instead, we supply the meaning or significance of these events (this is why people can have such different reactions to the same political events—not because their ‘value-perceiving organs’ are malfunctioning, but simply because they are applying different values).

Existential values for meaningful and enduring political engagement

The third stage for developing meaningful and enduring political engagement that avoids this Venus flytrap of nihilism involves the actual constitution of the values or motivations for one’s political action. This is perhaps the most important step, but it requires passing through the previous two steps to lay its proper foundations.

When people choose to get involved in politics, it is usually because of some specific event or issue or overarching idea, with the goal to obtain a specific outcome—in other words, they hope to achieve some end, and this hope in the future serves as the primary motivation for their actions. Choosing a specific end as the prime motivation for political engagement seems not only natural, but also the only motivation possible. However, as discussed above and elsewhere, this hope-based orientation towards politics is the ground in which nihilism is sown.

The key issue is that because control over outcomes in politics is so diffuse and complicated, the fervor of one’s feelings and the intensity of one’s efforts may or may not result in the realization of the desired outcome. Perversely, the intensity of one’s efforts and fervor for the cause is often directly related to the intensity of the disappointment if that outcome is not realized. In other words, the less one cares, the less the failure to realize a specific political outcome matters; just as the more one cares, the more one is impacted by failure, and therefore the deeper the subsequent apathy or nihilism which are such a concern for the stability and endurance of representative political systems. Thus, resolving this issue about the source of this apathy and nihilism would be a major boon for those concerned with citizen participation and the quality of representative government.

So if hope is not a valid motivation for political engagement, for all the reasons previously discussed, then what are the proper values for meaningful and enduring political engagement? This is where the existential recommendations from Nietzsche provide important clues.

For all the reasons discussed before, the approach most likely to prevent this slide into political apathy and nihilism, while still motivating intense engagement in political struggle, is through the creation of life-affirming values that Nietzsche recommended, only applied to politics in particular. As such, the primary recommendation of the Existential Citizenship Project in regards to the orientation towards the political system most likely to produce not only meaningful but also enduring political engagement regardless of the success or failure of a specific political project is from the point of view of overcoming resistance in the process itself, and, in fact, seeking out ever greater resistances.

This is a much different proposition than the more conventional hope-based approaches to political engagement. As such, exactly what such an orientation would be like is difficult to conceive at this point, but for all the reasons previously discussed, this is likely to be the best approach to politics to both protect against apathy or nihilism, and to motivate meaningful and enduring political engagement regardless of the success or even failure of deeply personal political projects. The elaboration of this kind of novel orientation towards the political system will constitute a substantial aspect of the subsequent development of the Existential Citizenship Project.

What do you think? Is this the right prescription for meaningful and enduring political engagement? Or does it miss something important? Leave me a comment and let me know what you think about this post or about the Existential Citizenship Project.

[1] Thus Spoke Zarathustra I 15.

[2] Reginster, B. (2006). The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism. Harvard University Press, p. 87.

[3] For example, from Psychology Today, “Regardless of the initial causes, depression will not improve without emotional investment in creating and sustaining value…the result of creating and maintaining value is a revitalization of the sense of meaning and purpose that diminishes in depression.” (; See also “Valuation of Life as Outcome and Mediator of a Depression Intervention for Older African Americans: The Get Busy Get Better Trial” (

[4] An important meta-meta-ethical point here regarding the valuation of values themselves is that the standard for judging values is going to depend on what is assumed to be the highest or best outcome for humans. If the ideal outcome is assumed to be what is best for the collective, then the ‘best’ values will be those which contribute the most to the good of the collective; whereas if the ultimate good is conceived as the fullest realization of the essential natures of individuals, then the ‘best’ values will be those which contribute most to this end (as well as the possibility for all sorts of permutations of these two ends, e.g., that what is best for society is the fullest realization of individuals, etc.).

Regardless, the primary issue is that assessing the value of values itself requires the estimation of values. One significant aspect of the project of Nietzsche, and perhaps his most subtle and elegant work, which unfortunately cannot be elaborated at this point, is his attempt to define an ‘objective’ basis for the valuation of values, while acknowledging that there are no longer any objective bases for valuation. This is where the hyperindividualism of his existential orientation come into play, in that what is objectively most valuable to me is my willing to overcome the resistance to my individual aspirations. Again, Nietzsche proposes a complex yet elegant argument here for the reconciliation of the seemingly contradictory claims of both a loss of objectivity and an objective value, which unfortunately I cannot develop further at this point.

[5] Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886); On the Genealogy of Morality (1887); Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer (1888); The Antichrist (1888)

[6] Reginster (2006), pp. 45-47; WP 11-12, 343; BT, Preface 4; Ecce Homo IV 7; TI V 4.

[7] There is another subtle and complicated point here, which I am still in the process of working out, which again involves two seeming contradictions by Nietzsche. While on the one hand he often calls for and praises the honest confrontation with this world, he also often acknowledges the utility and even the need to stop at superficial appearances, for example, in his criticisms of the uncurbed ‘will to Truth’ as another cause of nihilism (WP 3; Gay Science 344) and in his praises of his beloved Greeks: “Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, worlds, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial—out of profundity” (Gay Science, Preface 4).

In the context of the Existential Citizenship Project, I am not sure yet how or even if Nietzsche’s injunction to live by appearances applies to motivating meaningful and enduring political engagement. The frank confrontation of the reality of politics is core principle of the Existential Citizenship Project, as otherwise the temptation is to diverge into a hope-based rationale for political action, which more often than not culminates in apathy, cynicism, or outright nihilism. In his philosophy, Nietzsche reconciles this seeming contradiction through references to beneficial illusions of art (GS 107, 299) as a “will to deception [with] a good conscience” (GM III 25). How or if this fits into the Existential Citizenship Project, I am not sure yet.

[8] “Well-being as you understand it — that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible…” (BGE 225)

[9] BGE 44

[10] Reginster (2006), 27; TI, V 6; Z III 12; GM, III 28; GS 107).

[11] Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Friedrich Nietzsche,” vol. 5, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 507.

[12] Reginster, B. (2006). The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism. Harvard University Press, p. 11-12.

[13] TI, V 3

[14] See footnote #7

Hope, Tragedy, and Meaningful Political Engagement

At its core, the main goal of the Existential Citizenship Project—to provide incentive for meaningful and enduring political engagement—is an offshoot of the original project of Friedrich Nietzsche to overcome nihilism. Thus, in many ways, to understand the aims of Nietzsche is to understand the aims of the Existential Citizens Project, and vice versa. That said, as will be demonstrated in this post and others, the Existential Citizenship Project also significantly modifies and extends the ideas of Nietzsche, in particular by substantially expanding the scope of their application well beyond what he foresaw or intended.

Again, the original project of Nietzsche was to identify the causes of the creeping nihilism of his time, as the debilitating belief that meaningful action is pointless or impossible in this world, and to explain how this nihilism can be overcome. Likewise, the goals of the Existential Citizenship Project are to also identify the causes of the apathy, pessimism, and nihilism which characterize so much of the political engagement, or lack thereof, of our politics today, and to also provide guidance for how this malaise can be overcome. So far, so good, with this narrowing of focus to just political engagement seeming to be the only difference.

However, these recommendations from Nietzsche famously focus on the promotion of a radical aristocratic hyperindividualism as a counterbalance to the spread of this nihilism, which he saw as infecting the majority of people through their uncritical acceptance of prevailing values and beliefs. Such an elitist and highly individualistic emphasis seem fundamentally at odds with the purpose of the Existential Citizenship Project to promote the widespread engagement of ordinary people with day-to-day politics. This post and subsequent posts will begin to show how the Existential Citizenship Project actually reconciles this hyperindividualism of Nietzsche with a decidedly communitarian concept of political engagement to produce a new kind of citizen, but also how this new conception of citizenship would not be possible without the prescient insights of Nietzsche into the nihilism of his time, or without his highly original and provocative recommendations for the overcoming of this nihilism.

Nietzsche and nihilism

To begin, on the one hand, most intellectual and political leaders of Nietzsche’s time were announcing contemporary European culture and civilization as the crowning achievement of history, and even Europeans themselves as the culmination of biological evolution, owing in large part to the success of the Enlightenment project in realizing the highest ideals and moral values through rationality and optimism. In contrast, Nietzsche saw instead a fatally sick culture that was in decline because of these same ideals and values, but also in denial and unable to recognize its own sickness.

For example, as Nietzsche describes of himself in the preface of one of the last collections of his writings:

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. This history can be related even now; for necessity itself is at work here. This future speaks even now in a hundred signs, this destiny announces itself everywhere; for this music of the future all ears are cocked even now. For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect.[1]

Gloomy passages like this one are why Nietzsche is all too often perceived as a proponent of this nihilism he foresaw. However, the bulk of his writings, and the main thrust of his entire philosophical project, show the opposite: That while Nietzsche may have been a prophet of this nihilism, he was also its most pointed and vocal critic.

Hope as a cause of nihilism

In particular, Nietzsche diagnosed this nihilism as the product of the inability of these prevailing Enlightenment values based on rationalism and empiricism[2] and optimism[3] to provide the ultimate meaning for life that humans need.[4] In other words, while these values may have been instrumentally effective in fostering the increasing identification of causes and effects (i.e., in effectively promoting a scientific orientation towards the world), this identification of causes and their effects does not of itself provide any greater objective meaning for the world—rather, it removes such meaning from the world without replacing it with anything else.[5] Because humans have an innate need for meaning beyond basic cause-and-effect, the inevitable result of this demystification of the world, according to Nietzsche, is nihilism as a loss of meaning or motivation.

A history of this valuation of rationality and of its inherent shortcomings will have to wait, but a previous post traces the history of our uniquely modern conception of hope via the transformations over time of the myth of Pandora, and of the perverse role of this conception of hope in actually engendering the apathy and cynicism that characterize so much of our contemporary politics. As such, it bears noting that Nietzsche also identifies this uniquely modern conception of hope as a primary cause of the creeping nihilism in modern Western society, and also invokes the Pandora myth we have inherited from the ancient Greeks to help explain why this is such a problem.

For example, in his book Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, first published in 1878, in the section Nietzsche titles a “History of the Moral Feelings,” he provides an aphoristic account of different aspects of the moral feelings which have guided humankind to its present state. Of these moral feelings, Nietzsche describes hope, but does so in the way the ancient Greeks saw it, in contrast to the way we moderns see it. This is an important point for Nietzsche because these contrasts reveal substantial differences in worldview, with direct implications for the emergence of the nihilism Nietzsche describes of the Europe of his time. This is also an important point for the Existential Citizenship Project because what Nietzsche indicates about hope here also pertains to the apathy and nihilism of our contemporary politics, for which the Existential Citizenship Project provides the remedy:

HOPE. Pandora brought the box of ills and opened it. It was the gift of the gods to men, outwardly a beautiful and seductive gift, and called the Casket of Happiness. Out of it flew all the evils, living winged creatures, thence they now circulate and do men injury day and night. One single evil had not yet escaped from the box, and by the will of Zeus Pandora closed the lid and it remained within. Now for ever man has the casket of happiness in his house and thinks he holds a great treasure; it is at his disposal, he stretches out his hand for it whenever he desires; for he does not know the box which Pandora brought was the casket of evil, and he believes the ill which remains within to be the greatest blessing, it is hope. Zeus did not wish man, however much he might be tormented by the other evils, to fling away his life, but to go on letting himself be tormented again and again. Therefore he gives Man hope—in reality it is the worst of all evils, because it prolongs the torments of Man.[6]

We moderns see hope as an obvious good, as a palliative for the evils and other misfortunes which occur in the world through the expectation of better things. In contrast, as Nietzsche describes here and I describe in more detail elsewhere, the ancient Greeks—at least before their own descent into nihilism—instead saw hope as the worst of all the evils, precisely because of the way it focuses our minds not on our present, actual circumstances but on the expectation of a better future which may or may not happen when or the way we want.

In other words, the ‘evil’ of hope conceived in our uniquely modern way is that the more our expectations of a better future go unfulfilled, especially in dire circumstances, the more likely we are to see our needs and desires (i.e., our values) as not conducive with or realizable in this world, which is nihilism. In contrast, the Greeks of this era, whom Nietzsche calls “the best turned out, most beautiful, most envied type of humanity to date,”[7] avoided a nihilistic worldview for as long as they did by embracing a tragic view of life as beautiful even without ultimate meaning, and in choosing to confront this world as it is. That even these “cheerful” Greeks eventually succumbed to decadence and nihilism was for Nietzsche an important lesson both in understanding how such a thing could happen and how it could be avoided.[8]

Tragedy and the loss of heroism

It also bears remembering at this point that Nietzsche was originally a philologist, or what we would now call a comparative linguist, but which during his time also involved extensive study of the classics, with a special focus on ancient Greece. As such, he was deeply familiar with the language, history, and the culture of the ancient Greeks. This familiarity is in part why he so often used them as a template for his critiques of his own time, including his identification of hope as not only an evil, but the greatest of the evils, and of the deleterious effects which have resulted from the modern exaltation of hope.

For example, in his first book, Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (changed by Nietzsche to Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism in later editions), Nietzsche describes early Athenian drama, in which a robed and masked chorus enacts a pageant on stage, as an analgesic the ancient Greeks developed to confront and transcend the ultimate meaninglessness of the universe—the awareness of which was the tragedy of this life for the Greeks.[9] “With this chorus,” Nietzsche writes:

The deep-minded Hellene, who is so singularly qualified for the most delicate and severe suffering, consoles himself—he who has glanced with piercing eye into the very heart of the terrible destructive processes of so-called universal history, as also into the cruelty of nature, and is in danger of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the will. Art saves him, and through art life saves him—for herself.[10]

In particular, this consolation from the tragedy of existence came from the ritualistic participation of the audience in the dramatic spectacle. The combination of the themes of the tragedy, the rhythmic voice of the chorus, and the identification of the audience with the chorus produced an ecstatic feeling of unity that Nietzsche called ‘Dionysian’ (for the god of wine, fertility, theater, and epiphany):

For we must know that in the rapture of the Dionysian state, with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence, there is a lethargic element, wherein all personal experiences of the past are submerged. It is by this gulf of oblivion that the everyday world and the world of Dionysian reality are separated from each other.[11]

However, Nietzsche also goes on to describe how this emancipatory aspect of Greek drama was lost with the introduction of episodic narrative into Greek drama, which emphasized coherence, realism, and resolution over enigmatic profundity.[12] This turn to a much more structured narrative form of drama is now lauded as a pivotal innovation in the evolution of early modernist culture. For Nietzsche, though, this change in the dramatic ethos mirrored the more widespread movement of Greek culture away from the heroic affirmation of life as beautiful in spite of its ultimately tragic nature, and towards the Socratic rationality and optimism which were to go on to constitute such fundamental aspects of Western thought and science.[13]

According to Nietzsche, the move away from this communal celebration of the tragedy of this world reflected the collective loss of nerve of Athenian society, resulting in a nihilism-fueled decadence which sapped the moral and physical strength of the Athenians, thereby precipitating the subsequent decline and eclipse of their civilization.[14] Nietzsche identifies this same dynamic in the trajectory of European culture, culminating in its own inevitable decline into pessimism and nihilism.[15] This is also the same relation between hope and nihilism that I identify in contemporary American politics.

Nietzsche, nihilism, and existential citizenship

However, as mentioned before, what is extremely important for our present purposes is that, for all his bad reputation, Nietzsche is not just a disgruntled critic or a pessimistic nihilist. Instead, he goes on to provide a positive prescription to counteract this inexorable malaise in his overarching project of what he calls the revaluation of values. The remedies for nihilism that Nietzsche proposes via this project are not just esoteric philosophic doctrines, but practical principles for action meant to be applied and tested to real life.

This is why the project of Nietzsche has such direct relevance to our politics today via a new existentialist conception of citizenship. How this Nietzschean revaluation of values can be applied today to inspire both meaningful and enduring political engagement, even in the face of the failure and defeat of deeply personal political projects, will be the focus of subsequent posts.

What do you think? Is hope a toxic influence in politics? Can tragedy be a legitimate basis for meaningful and enduring political engagement? Leave me a comment and let me know what you think about this post or about the Existential Citizenship Project.

[1] Will to Power, Preface, 2.

[2] As the belief that certain truths exist, and that human reason and experience are the chief sources of knowledge of those truths.

[3] As the belief that these truths will be evidence of an underlying beneficial order of the universe—as enforced by a deity or not—that is ultimately discoverable by human reason and experience.

[4] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I 15.

[5] Birth of Tragedy, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” section 1.

[6] Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Book 1, 71.

[7] BT, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” section 1.

[8] Ibid.

[9] BT, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” section 4; BT 1.

[10] BT, 7.

[11] Ibid.

[12] BT, 11.

[13] BT, 17-18.

[14] “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” section 4, in Birth of Tragedy

[15] Ibid.; See also Will to Power, chapters 1 (“Nihilism”) and 2 (“Concerning the History of European Nihilism”)